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ABSTRACT 
Recently, the Pew Environment Group released a study that finds that E. U. fisheries have 
failed to reduce fleet capacity thus exerting fishing pressure on stocks at two time sustainable 
levels. Overcapacity and overcapitalisation was identified as the principal failure of the Common 
Fisheries Policy. The study highlights that member-states failed to take environmental and 
social concerns into consideration when allocating public funding.  
This conclusion may be important in the CFP reform (2012) and put the discussion about the 
tools to get sustainable management.  
The idea of creating markets for fishing rights as a means of internalising the externalities 
derived from the common property nature of fisheries have received considerable attention by 
the founding fathers of Law and Economics and Fisheries Economics. The solution is to create 
a market of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and confide in the self-regulation of such a 
system to conduct fisheries to economic efficiency and promote inter-temporal sustainable use. 
Rights Based Management schemes have already been experimented in specific fisheries and 
localizations. These experiences have teaching results about good practices of sustainable 
management and the limitations of these tools. The conclusions are fundamental to explore the 
feasibility of these tools as instruments of conservation in the CFP. The purpose of this 
communication is to enter this debate. 
Key Words: Fisheries, Individual Transferable Quotas Rights Based Management. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, the Pew Environment Group [1] released a study that finds that E. U. fisheries have 
failed to reduce fleet capacity thus exerting fishing pressure on stocks at two/three time 
sustainable levels. Overcapacity and overcapitalisation of the sector was identified as the 
principal failure of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  
This conclusion may be well important in the CFP reform (2012) and put again the discussion 
about the tools that can be used to get sustainable management and better cohesion. In a 
drafted “Green Paper” on the Reform, the European Commission is launching a wide, no-hold-
barred consultation to the national administrations, stakeholders, researchers and other 
interested people. The objectives are to discuss the problems of this CFP and to explore the 
alternatives and the ways forward the new reform of fisheries policy.  
 
The principle of “Relative Stability” shapes the Common Fisheries Policy. Nowadays, the 
conservation and management regime of EU fisheries is based upon TACs and quotas. But, in 
recent years, much attention has focused on ITQs (Individual Transferable Quotas) and other 
Rights Based Management regimes as an approach that will encourage more efficient use in 
fisheries by the allocation of private property rights. One important issue in the debate of CFP 
reform is, precisely, the introduction of ITQs and other similar RBM schemes. Our paper is a 
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contribution to this debate. The paper investigates the feasibility of introducing these new 
management regimes in the CFP.  
 
 
1)  THE CURRENT SITUATION OF EUROPEAN FISHERIES  
 
Since the early 80s, when “Blue Europe” was settled, almost three decades have passed and 
the Common Fisheries Policy is confronted with major challenges[2,3]  
Two fundamental causes explain the current state of European fisheries: internal systemic 
weakness of the conservation and management regime and external challenges [ 4,5].  
CFP has not delivered sustainable exploitation of the resources. Conservation policy fails. Many 
stocks are outside safe biological limits. If current trends subsist, many stocks will collapse. 
They’ve been exploited too heavily, particularly the demersal stocks. At the same time, fishing 
capacity went on growing. Illegal fishing and the lack of effective enforcement are also notable 
elements of this picture. 
This situation isn’t specific to the Community. In fact, worldwide concern about over- fishing and 
overcapacity in the fisheries sector is well documented. The economic fragility of the sector, 
reflected in poor profitability and declining employment, is the result of a special conjunction of 
over-investment, rising costs and diminishing resource stocks. 
At the political level, the difficulties, associated with the design and implementation of a 
regulatory system, are substantial: social constraints, diversity of socio-economic structural 
conditions of the fisheries sector in the member states, lack of involvement of the stakeholders 
in the management policy. 
Another important factor of explanation of this situation is external challenge. The enlargement 
of European Union and the globalisation of the economy, the emergence of new players in 
world fisheries (especially coastal developing countries) and the increased focus on the 
environment are, perhaps, the most visible elements of this new context. In the international 
scene, the CFP is confronted with a “creeping jurisdiction” process - the slowly slide to the 
coastal countries’ jurisdiction of many resources which were usually “common-property”.  
 
This picture is not entirely negative. CFP had positive results. It has managed the resources 
and contained conflicts at sea, provided some degree of stocks stability and avoided the total 
collapse of stocks in areas with higher pressure and assured the availability of supplies to the 
Europeans. However, according to the Commission, these results have been achieved at a high 
price in terms of the long-term viability of the sector and with inefficiencies in the allocation of 
resources that, perhaps, could have been more profitable if they were addicted to other sectors 
in the global European economy. The critical problem is that the fleet profitability is jeopardised 
by the under-utilisation of investments. The excess capacity and a more-or-less constant value 
of landings to be shared between a large number of actors, reduces the capacity of each vessel 
to earn an adequate income. In this context, the subsidy policy, artificially reducing the costs 
and risks of investment, in an already over-capitalised industry, promoted over-supply of capital. 
Recently, the Pew Environment Group commissioned a study (Report of Poseidon Aquatic 
Management Ltd, 2010) assessing the economic, environmental and social impacts of the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, from 2000 to 2006. The members evaluated in this 
study accounted for more than 90% of the European fisheries subsidies (that amounted to 3,2 
billion Euros). The key objective of the structural policy, that was to bring the fishing capacity of 
the European fleet into the line with the available biological resources, was not attended. 
Overcapacity and overcapitalization of the sector was identified as the principal failure of the 
CFP. This conclusion may be well important in the CFP reform and put again the discussion 
about the tools that can be used to get sustainable management [6]. 
 
2)  THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERVENTION OF “BLUE EUROPE” 
 
The Management and Conservation Regime of fisheries in the European Union is, to a high 
degree, the result of an historic process with multiple compromises among national devices and 
political interests [7,8]. But, to look at the CFP as a simple, empirical result, of a day-to-day 
experience, is an error. Understanding the current difficulties is not possible without paying 
attention to the philosophy of intervention underlined in the options of 1983, when “Blue Europe” 
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was settled. The analysis of some basic documents and initial proposals of the Commission, in 
the 70s, allows identifying the philosophy and theoretical purposes that, implicitly or explicitly, 
were subjacent to the definition of the common fisheries management regime.  
 
Since the beginning, two basic alternatives for the formulation of the European fisheries policy 
were to be considered: 
? At one extreme, a liberal policy that should only establish competition rules in a 
common market;  
? At the other, a policy of effective intervention, administered at a superior level, which 
could manage the resources in a perspective of equilibrium between the dynamic, 
biological conditions of fish growth and the economic conditions of resource use. 
The Commission choice on the second was very clear: the necessity of a “comprehensive” 
fisheries policy was obvious. This choice rested upon the presupposition that free access 
(central to the Treaty of Rome) would lead to the overexploitation of the resources [9,10]. This 
conviction was explicitly made: “The straightforward implementation of the principle of equal 
access is bound to result in the rapid exhaustion of resources; the consequences of such a 
situation would be unacceptable” (SEC (1975) 4503 final, p. 9). 
Of course, that was a problem for the Commission. Having the responsibility to assure the 
principles of the Treaty, it was out of discussion the opposition to the “equal access” principle. 
But, the fear of the “fishing race” and “overfishing” problems justified an intervention policy that 
could regulate the activity in the sector and obviate the perverse effects of open access. 
For such a policy to be feasible, it needed a central authority. That involved a supranational 
management of resources because, allowing free arbitration of the sector development by 
national states, could lead to discriminatory action and poor enforcement and control. In this 
context, we can also understand the purpose of the so-called Common Structural Policy. This 
policy could help the poorest (and most dependent on fisheries) coastal areas in Europe by 
funding the modernization of the obsolete fleets of some member states. The “fisheries fund” 
(Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance) was, in this sense, one of the fundamental 
elements of a policy of structural reform but also of inclusion and cohesion in Europe, in what 
concerned the fisheries.  
 
Settled the philosophy of intervention, the discussion then turned to the management tools.  
The choice was on command and control instruments. The control of catches and selectivity in 
fisheries, with the establishment of TACs (Total Authorized Catches) and quotas, and technical 
measures of conservation (closed seasons, closed areas, minimum dimensions of fish caught 
and so on) were the preferred forms of regulation. The motives of this option were based on 
several reasons that included an implicit evaluation of the advantages of this kind of controls 
vis-à-vis other regulation alternatives, namely, those usually designed as indirect-economic 
tools, like taxes or ITQs, whose principal objective is efficiency in resource use.  
 
At least, five fundamental reasons made the justification of that choice. 
First, the Commission recognised that a common policy had costs and generated a lot of 
administrative problems. The advantages of direct controls were clear. The design and control 
of these tools were simpler. The necessary biological information existed. The Community could 
count on the experience of organisations like CIEM, NEAFC or NAFO. On the other hand, the 
implementation of the regulation was a task that the Commission could not develop without the 
collaboration of the national administration services. The diversity of those, in terms of structure 
and efficiency, implied the existence of a simple and clear regulation, of unquestionable 
scientific hardness, as a pre-condition for an effective implementation. Of course, a policy based 
on economic tools should bring problems almost insurmountable: exigency in information, high 
transaction costs in the preparation and negotiation of regulation, doubtful capacity of execution 
of the administrative staffs in several member states. 
Second, the political constraint. Taxes and other economic tools, which are very exigent in 
political negotiations, were simply abandoned. Difficulties in tax harmonisation in EU are well 
known. Taxation is a sensible question, seen as a domain of national sovereignty. All 
concessions in this field are problematic. Direct controls are less exigent and facilitate the 
compromises. 
Third, the problem of control and enforcement. The Commission has always given this question 
a central role in the Common Policy. Reasons are obvious. The Commission put the problem in 
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ethics terms: “It’s the only way to assure that the sacrifices of some member states in the 
recovery of the stocks are not in vain because of the irresponsible action of others”. Once again, 
direct controls had advantages. Enforcement was easier with simple regulation that agents 
could understand, less costly in administrative terms, and, if there existed effective means of 
inspection, evasion was minimized.  
Fourth, the Commission’s preoccupation with uncertainty in stock evolution and environmental 
and economic changes, made the need for flexible tools. The possible necessity of urgent 
actuation in situations of environmental crisis, gave the direct-control tools a strong advantage, 
because they were easier to manage and modify.  
Finally, the Commission emphasised the objective of minimising the social costs of the fisheries 
policy. In an original proposal of September 76, the Commission explicitly expressed the 
preoccupation with social inclusion in the fisheries sector and with the European cohesion. In 
the opinion of the commissioners, the management regime should assure “an equitable 
distribution of the limited resources between the member-states”, and “maintain, as far as it is 
possible, the level of employment and income in the coastal zones and in the areas mostly 
dependent on fisheries”. The European Parliament made pressure in this way, too, stating that 
the biological basis on which conservation and management regime should rest upon, could not 
be more than a starting point and, at least in the short run, the guarantees of employment and 
social inclusion were irreplaceable objectives. It is true that direct controls could not avoid the 
sacrifices of fishermen, unemployment and social tension. However, the reaction to other 
management economic tools that result in the abandonment of the less efficient producers, 
could be worst.  
 
 Facing these constraints, the answer was clear: A system of TACs and quotas was a simpler 
solution for the problems of equitable distribution of fishing opportunities, depending only on the 
quotas distribution formula between member-states. This formula of definition and allocation of 
use rights in European fisheries is now dependent upon several factors, like the dependency on 
fisheries of some coastal areas, level of employment and redistribution of quotas by means of 
minimising the effects of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction on distant water fisheries. This is the 
so-called Principle of Relative Stability that shapes the Common Fisheries Policy. It can be seen 
as a means of establishing a balance between the promotion of economic efficiency, in the long 
run, and the necessary social-economic equilibrium in the coastal areas, in the short run. 
 
 
 3) RIGHTS BASED MANAGEMENT AND THE REFORM OF THE CFP  
 
Besides the “balanced” fundaments of CFP, this economic and juridical construction did not 
obviate the problems we highlighted in the first part of this paper. The choice of direct control 
tools, in the regime that was designed in 1983, means that those instruments were, implicitly, 
better evaluated. But there were costs. Direct controls do not eliminate “common property” 
externalities. These tools can help the recovery of stocks but they do not exclude competition 
and inter-temporal rationality is not imposed to the agents. So, inefficiency is maintained and 
overcapacity and overexploitation persists [11]. 
 
Now, what is interesting to analyse is the following: 
Recognising the difficult situation of the fisheries sector and the management problem, the EU 
went on a great effort of reforming. Last Reform of 2002 pretended to mark a new beginning for 
the CFP. The main changes implicated: 
? a long term approach in fisheries management; 
? a simpler policy of fleet capacity, putting on the Member states the responsibility of 
reduction of the fishing effort; 
? a better application and enforcement of common rules;  
? the stakeholders’ involvement. 
But problems subsisted. In the core, they had to do with the persistence of conflicts between 
objectives. One of the most relevant is the problem of conflictuality between decreasing fishing 
effort and the need of maintenance of jobs and of some socio-economic balance in the coastal 
areas. The maintenance of decent standards of living for fishermen would demand increases or, 
at least, the same level of captures. Such seems to be contradictory with the urgent need of 
stock recovery [12, 13]. 
 5 
 
 
THE QUOTA HOPPING CASE 
 
The so-called “Quota Hopping” problem [14-16] is a very good example of our doubts and 
preoccupations. In the centre of the problematic we find the Relative Stability principle. The 
fixed formula of quotas distribution between member-states reflects the fact that European 
fishermen representation is still linked to national and local communities. But this territorial logic 
is in perfect contradiction with the development conditions of a free market (as supported in the 
Treaty). In fact, free movement of capital and the “Free Establishment” principle rest under a 
different logic [17,18]. 
“Quota-hopping”, usually understood as the flagging of fishing vessels in order to fish against 
the catch quotas of another country, is a by-product of CFP. By purchasing vessels and quotas 
in different countries, some fisheries enterprises act like perfect multinational firms capturing 
fishing stocks that were supposed to belong to national fishing communities.  
UK situation gives a “good” example [14,17]. Although not restricted to this member state, it is 
the case of UK fleet that has attracted the most foreign investment, especially from Spain and 
Netherlands, and gave the phenomenon visibility for discussion. Something like 25% of British 
quotas were held, in the end of the nineties, by foreign-owned quota-hopping vessels.  
This situation represents an important critic of the stakeholders to the CFP rules. They attacked 
the way the quota system is being circumvented by the so-called “flag” ships, which are vessels 
owned in one country but registered in another to allow access to its waters.  
 
LESSONS FROM QUOTA HOPPING 
 
“Quota-hopping” analysis may give important lessons for CFP reform [19]. The first lesson has a 
special interest for several Social Sciences, from Sociology to Politics, from Economics to 
History. In fact, this is a good field to investigate the dichotomy between a national oriented 
policy and the process of de-territorialisation arising from single market construction. We can 
observe how quota hopping emerges under the incompatibilities between the trans-
nationalization process promoted through the “Europeanization” of EU policies and the territorial 
logic claimed by the national governments. 
In this context, an important issue is revealed that, perhaps, surmounts the CFP, itself. That's 
the pure question of democracy: how can economic powers, in the process of market 
development, pass over the political decisions made by the democratic, elected institutions? 
And, in a certain sense, surmount the objective of cohesion that was implicit in the 
supranational management? In such a policy, both government and non-governmental agents 
no longer have the monopoly over the political agenda. CFP is defined through permanent 
interactions and negotiations. The non-territorial logic of EU governance challenges the social 
order inherited from European welfare states. These transnational actors, using EU rules, move 
permanently in the search of more favorable conditions and profits. This mobility of capital 
encourages more competition in the European fisheries sector, and, at the same time, raises 
more social uncertainty in the Member states [14].  
So, economic and social actors in the EU are no longer subject to one political authority that is 
able to guard the values of justice and equity. It seems that there are some actors who are 
playing “the rules of the game”, but, at the same time, surmounting the power of elected 
governments. The dynamics towards trans-nationalisation encourages a diffusion of power and 
blurs the exercise of political democratic elected administration.  
 
 
THE DEBATE ON RIGHTS BASED MANAGEMENT 
 
Quota-hopping analysis highlights another important subject for the future of Common Fisheries 
Policy: the issue of Rights Based Management [20,21]. 
All fisheries management systems in the world have introduced some form of use/access rights 
to face the problems derived from the “common property” nature of fisheries. The idea of 
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creating markets for fishing rights as a means of internalizing the externalities derived from the 
common property nature of fisheries have received considerable attention by the founding 
fathers of Law and Economics and Fisheries Economics such as Coase, Scott and Christy. The 
solution is to create a market of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and confide in the self-
regulation of such a system to conduct the fisheries to the economic efficiency and to promote 
inter-temporal sustainable use of resources. 
There are several possibilities of doing this. In general, we first need to determine the TAC that 
guaranties the sustainable use of the fish stock and then we can divide this total amount in 
several unit quotas that are distributed between the fishing enterprises. A market for quotas can 
also be created. The objective is that, after some time, the property rights will be driven to the 
most efficient agents, those that can allocate the resources in a perspective of optimal 
sustainable use along the time. Because they are the “real owners” they will internalize the 
effects of externalities. 
 
Rights Based Management schemes have already been experimented in some specific 
fisheries and localizations. These experiences have a lot of teaching results about good 
practices of sustainable fisheries management and also about the limitations/ risks of these 
tools. These conclusions are fundamental to explore the feasibility of these tools as instruments 
of conservation in the CFP [22, 23] 
This kind of economic methods has a special advantage in the sense that they introduce 
mechanisms that should conduct the fisheries to the efficiency, eliminating the less efficient 
producers and changing, effectively, the agents’ behavior.  
ITQs are usually considered the best regulation choice on efficiency grounds. Granting the 
fisherman an individual quota may reduce the incentives to race for fish. We can expect: 
? benefits at the capacity level and fishing effort rationalization,  
? reduced fleet size and optimal vessel configuration,  
? flexible and extended fishing seasons,  
? higher catch-per-unit of effort.  
This may, also, enhance the quality of landings and improve markets and safety operations by 
avoiding the landings glut, by reducing storage costs and so on.  
 
But there are also a lot of problems. Professor Copes, in the mid 80s, when the first 
experiences with ITQs were evaluated, referred the problems of property concentration and, of 
course, the consequent problem of unemployment. After a period of change of quotas in the 
market, the problem of monopolization of the sector is well documented in several fishing-cases 
analysis. The number of owners tends to decline in time and there may be widening income 
disparities.  
The unemployment is a huge difficulty of this method. The abandonment of the less efficient 
producers creates a lot of difficulties in some coastal areas where the mostly dependent on 
fisheries populations live. Given the poor capacity of inter-professional mobility of many 
fishermen, the introduction of these methods accelerates the social crisis in those depressed 
maritime worlds and put in danger some important cultures and ways of living.  
We can also introduce other important issues. One relates with the mechanism design of this 
kind of methods. For example: How can we make the initial division and distribution of quotas? 
A “Grand-fathering” system? Auctions? Should the initial distribution take account of “historic 
catches” from the companies? And what about those companies that, in a certain moment, did 
not enter a certain fisheries, but has now a real interest in the business? For those who were in 
the initial distribution, the quotas seem like a “windfall gain”.  
Owners of initial quota will sell at a price representing the full present value of the stream of 
rents generated, that is, the ones wishing to enter will have to pay, in advance, the full value of 
resource rents – it’s what we call a “transitional gains trap”. 
According to Ronald Coase, this is not a problem, because what is important is the final result. 
Something like the “Invisible Hand” will drive the system to the best equilibrium solution. And in 
the short time? What are the social and political reactions to these uncomfortable situations? 
Also, the problems of monitoring. Usually, economists highlight these methods because they 
introduce some kind of self-regulation. In fact, the sense of ownership should give the property-
rights users, the real perception that the results of their actions will affect the net economic 
benefits that results from resource utilization. So, they should manage the resources in a 
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sustainable way. But, the reality shows that, without a government control policy, a lot of 
problems subsist, including data fouling and quota busting, discarding, more intensive utilization 
of best fishing grounds, etc. 
And, of course, the problem of rents distribution: the issue of equity vs. efficiency always 
marking the debate in Economics. The economic theory proves the equivalence, in terms of 
efficiency, between the pigouvian tax and a scheme of ITQs, but the distribution gains between 
agents is still different. In the first case (pigouvian tax), the rents are optimized by the regulation 
Agency and, in the second (ITQs), rents and welfare gains are distributed between the private 
agents.  
Besides the theoretical discussion on efficiency grounds, still persists the practical, fundamental 
question. Rights based management can improve the efficiency in fisheries management. But, 
who will ultimately receive the gains of sustainable use of resources. How will the rents be 
distributed? Who are the winners, who are the losers? “The winner takes it all?” 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
What can we conclude about the possible generalization of these Rights Based Management 
schemes in the CFP? The principle of Relative Stability, which guides the allocation of fishing 
possibilities to the EU members, is, as we saw, an exemption from the internal market that is 
embedded in the CFP. However, the quota hopping is a signal that the agents circumvented this 
principle of territorial definition of rights. Perhaps, by setting up a transparent system for 
transfers of fishing rights, member states could more easily regulate and monitor such trade in 
use rights [24, 25] 
Since quota-hopping can be taken as the evidence of a desire to trade fish quotas at the EU 
level, we might think that a lot of inefficiencies are resulting from the actual regime of 
management and expect that in a new free regime of trade a clearly reduction in transaction 
costs would result. Of course, that would result in more economic efficiency. But, the issue of 
introducing a more liberal property rights trade system will have to confront the distributional 
effects of such a proposal.  
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